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The Timing of Retirement:
A Comparison of Expectations and Realizations
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I employ data drawnfrom the Social Security
Administration's Retirement HistorySurvey (RHS) to study the
accuracy of expectations concerning thetiming of retirement.
The RHS is ideally suited for thispurpose, in that it collects
information on retirement plans, andfollows respondents through
time so that one can identifyactual dates of retirement. The
data are consistent with the viewthat, when asked to report an
expected date of retirement, individualsname the most likely
date (i.e.a mode, rather than a mean).Furthermore, these
forecasts are highly accurate.There is very little evidence
that individuals' expectationswere systematically biased during
periods in which Congress legislatedlarge real increases in
social security benefits. Thissuggests either that the benefit
increags were anticipated,or that unanticipated changes in
benefits have little effecton retirement. The paper also








Modern life cycle theory is based upon the premise that
consumers think seriously and coherently about the relatively
distant and uncertain future.While the empirical validity of
this premise is controversial, existing evidence is eitherhighly
indirect, or anecdotal. To resolve this controversy, it is
necessary to conduct direct comparisons of consumers' plans and
expectationswith eventual realizations.
Previous empiricalwork on household expectations has
focused primarily on short run inflation (see Huizinga[1980),
Curtain [1982], Gramlich [1983], and Papadia [1982]; Aiginger
[1981] considers a somewhatbroader rangeof variables).
Accordingly, these studies shed very little light on the issue of
whether consumers form accurate expectations and successful
economic plans over relatively long time horizons.
In a separate paper (Bernheim [1987]),I have studied the
accuracy ofpre—retirementexpectationsconcerning social
security benefits. I found that while survey responses to
questions about expected benefits contain a relatively high level
of noise, there is nevertheless strong evidence that consumers do
think seriously about future events. While consumers do not form
expectations on the basis of all available information, they do
appear to be reasonably competent at making relatively accurate
forecasts conditional upon the information that they do use.
Indeed, the data broadly suggest thatconsumers correctly
anticipated the general effects of legislative action during the2
early 1970's, contrary to the supposition of most previous
authors (see e.g. Hurd and Boskin [1981], Anderson, Burkhauser,
and Quinn E1986J, and Burtless [1986]).
In the current paper, I employ data drawn from the Social
Security Administration's Retirement History Survey (RHS) to
study the accuracy of expectations concerning the timing of
retirement. This is an important complement tomy earlier work,
in that social security benefits are largely determined by
exogenous events, while retirement is a fundamental decision
variable.Accordingly, the emphasis here is on the accuracy of
economic plans, rather than pure expectations. While many
authors have previously studied determinants of the retirement
decision (see the surveys by Hurd [1983] and Mitchell and Fields
[1984]), all have simply assumed that. workers make systematic and
viable retirement plans.There is no previous test of this
proposition.
Themajorfindings of this study are as follows.
1.Survey responses to questions about expected dates of
retirement reflect modes, rather than means. That is, consumers
report the most likely date of retirement, rather than the mean
date, given subjective probabilities. This distinction is
extremely important, since the distribution of actual retirement
dates for a fixed expectation is highly skewed. Unlike thecase
of social security benefits, the evidence does notsupport the
view that consumers report noisy measures of expectations.
2. Most individuals are reasonably competent atforming3
relatively accurate expectations about the timing of retirement.
Alternatively, consumers apparently form serious economicplans,
and ordinarily stick to them. Perhapssurprisingly, there is
once again very little evidence to support the view that
expectations were abnormally inaccurate during periods in which
social security benefits enjoyed significantstatutory increases.
3.The accuracy of expectations differssystematically by
population subgroup.In contrast to my findings for social
security benefits, I find that men form more accurate retirement
expectations than women, although single women doappear to gain
relative accuracy as retirement approaches.Married women are
particularly prone to discover that they must work longer than
expected. Comparatively wealthy individuals tend to make
somewhat more accurate forecasts, but education doesnot improve
predictive skill.Some evidence also suggests that workers with
mandatory retirement dates typically retire much sooner than
expected,perhapsbecausetheysuppose erroneously that
alternative employment will be easy to find.
Work by Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn [1986) has also
employed the RHS data on retirement expectations. Their object
was to use this data in an analysis of behavior, rather than to
identify properties of reported expectations, as in the current
paper.My findings are at odds with the implicit assumptions
upon which these authors based their behavioral analysis, and
therefore call their results into question. Hall and 7ohnson
£1980] have also studied retirementexpectations, but their4
object was to model the formation of plans, rather than to
compare these plans with later realizations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
some alternativehypotheses aboutthe nature of reported
expectations concerning the timing of retirement. I describe the
data in section 3.Section 4 tests the view that individuals
report mean realizations given probabilistic beliefs. In section
5,I consider the hypothesis that respondents report modal
beliefs, i.e. most likely dates of retirement. Finding the
evidence favorable,I procede to a comparison of various
population subgroups in different survey years.
2. The Alternative Hypotheses
When an individual is asked to report his expected date of
retirement, what does his answer represent ? Survey questions
about expectations are unfortunately ambiguous, and admit several
possible interpretations.Yet if we are to make valid use of
these data in any behavioral context1 it is essential to resolve
this issue.
One possibility is that the typical individual reports the
mean of some subjective probability distribution.It is useful
to set up this hypothesis formally.Let R be the individual's
actual date of retirement.At some time t, he has access to
information, 1(t), which he uses to form subjective beliefs about
the timing of retirement.Let p[rII(t)] denote the subjective
probability that the individual will retire at date r, given5
available information at time t, and letER(t) denote his
reported expectation at time t. The firsthypothesis is that
(1) ER(t) =ECRII(t)J,
where EC.] indicates a mathematicalexpectation, based on the
probability distribution PC.].
Unless weplacesome additional restriction on the
subjective probability distribution,this proposition is not
testable.My strategy is to test it jointly with thehypothesis
of rational expectations.Specifically, if one assumes that the
subjective probability distributionPC.] coincides with the
objective distribution, then equation(1) suggests a regression
of R on an intercept, ER(t), and1(t). Under the joint
hypotheses, the intercept and coefficients of1(t) should be
zero, while the coefficient of ER(t) should be 1.It is, of
course, essential that one only include informationalvariables
that the individual actually used informing his expectations.
Since this is difficult to establisha priori, it is advisable to
conduct a weak form of this test byomitting the 1(t) entirely.
My Study of expected socialsecurity benefits provided
strong support for the analog of this firsthypothesis, and one
might therefore expect to find the datasupportive here as well.
Yet it is essential to understandthat retirement is a very
different kind of event than is therealization of social
security benefits. Manyworkers formextremely specific6
retirement plans, which they intend to follow barring unforeseen
circumstances. In contrast, workers may have only "ballpark"
notions about their social security benefits. Accordingly, it.is
easily conceivable that, when asked about their expectations,
individuals report means for social security benefits, but report
the most likely outcome for date of retirement.
This discussion leads naturally to the second hypothesis,
which is that measured expected dates of retirement reflect modes
of subjective distributions. Formally,
(2) ER(t) =argmaxp[rlI(t)]
r
Once again, this proposition is not testable in the absence of
further restrictions on the subjective distribution.As before,
my strategy is to test it jointly with the hypothesis of rational
expectations. Assuming that p[.) coincides with the true
objective distribution, one can compare measured expectations
with modal realizations.
While these two hypotheses certainly do not exhaust all
conceivable alternatives (e.g. perhapsindividuals report
medians, or pure noise),1 I take them to be the most interesting
possibilities.
3. Data
The data for this study are drawn from the Social Security
Administration's Retirement History Survey (RHS), which followed7
a sample of retirement—aged households (58 to 63 years old in
1969) for a period of 1.0years, beginning in 1969. Each
household was surveyed once every two years (1969, 1971, 1973,
1975, and 1979).Although the initial wave included more than
11,000households,therewassubstantial attrition over
successive waves.
Each working respondent reported his or her expectedage of
retirement in every survey year, with the exception of married
women, who were not asked this question in 1973. Using the
respondent's age,I tranformed this variable into ERET, the
expected date of retirement. Survey responses to questions about
expected retirement were extremely sparse in 1977 and 1979
(primarily because most of the sample had already retired by
1977); I therefore focus on expectations reported in the first
four survey waves.
The primary advantage of the RHS is that it allows the
analysttoidentifyrealizations by employing data from
subsequent survey waves. While the identification of a date of
retirement isusuallyproblemmatic,hereit poses few
difficulties.In the current context, it is not necessary or
even desirable to obtain a conceptually "correct" measure of
retirement. When an individual reports an expected date of
retirement, he may well have in mind some idiosynchratic notion
of what retirement means. However, unless he changes his notion
over time, one can assume that self—rported retirement refers to
the same potentially idiosynchratic event.Accordingly, I useB
self—reported retirement to construct RET, my measure of the
eventual realization.
Unfortunately, data on self—reported retirement is somewhat
incomplete.Although individuals do report whether or not they
consider themselves retired in each survey year, they are not
asked to indicate exactly when retirement took place. This
creates a problem, in that survfys were administered in alternate
years. In practice,I calculate RET as follows. First, I
identify the first survey year in which the respondent reported
himself to be retired. Second, for this same survey year, I
determine the date at which the respondent left his last job. If
this falls within the previous two years, I take it to be his
date of retirement. If it does not (typically because of missing
information), I determine the date at which the respondent began
to receive social security benefits.If this falls within the
previous two years, I take it to be his date of retirement. If
it does not, I simply assume that he retired midway between the
surveys.
In conjunctionwith testingthe first set of joint
hypotheses, I relate forecast errors to available information in
order to identify the kinds of information that individuals
either ignore or process incorrectly. I consider a large number
of informational variables, which I group into three categories.
The first category contains variables which measure other
reported expectations. The inclusion of these variables allows
me to determine whether or not individuals have internally9
consistent expectations,in the sense that they base all
expectations on the same set of information. Definitions of
specific variables follow.
ESS: expected social security benefits
EOI: expected retirement income, other than social
security
Data onexpectations is,of course,incomplete ——many
individuals who report an expected date ofretirement do not., for
example, report expected social security benefits.Accordingly,
I also use dummy variables, whichequal 1 if the individual
reports the associated expectation, and 0 otherwise.I refer to
the dummies corresponding to the twovariables listed above as
DSS and DOl.
The second category includes asingle variable, which is the
individual's current social securityentitlement, CBS, defined as
the level of benefits he wouldreceive under current law if he
retired immediately. CSS is, theoretically, part of each
individual's information set, in that itdepends only upon his
own past earnings history, andupon current law (which is public
information). My previous study of social security benefits
suggested that individuals fail to use much of theinformation
contained in CBS; since it is natural tosuppose that workers
adjust retirement plans upon learningmore about social security
entitlements, this information could be correlatedwith the
forecast error for date of retirementas well.
The third and final category includesvarious demographic10
variables and other household characteristics which might be
useful in predicting retirement. The list of variables includes:
MAR: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
repondent is married (1 =married,0 =other),
DIV: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
repondent is divorced (1 =divorced,0 =other),
WID: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
respondent. is a widow or widower (1 =widowor
widower, 0 =other),
AGE: the respondent's age,
SAGE: the respondent's spouse's age,
ED: the respondent's level of educational attainment
(measured in number of years),
SED: the repondent's spouse's level of educational
attainment,
the household's net wealth (including financial
assets, businesses, and real property),
GH: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
respondent reports his health as being better than
average for his age (1 =better,0 =other),
BH: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
respondent reports his health as being worse than
average for his age (1 =worse,0 =other),
KIDS: number of children,
COMPRET: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
repondent's employer maintains a compulsory11
retirement age (1. =yes,0 =no),
MOVE: a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
repondent has moved within the past two years.
Before passing on to analysis of the data, it is important
to discuss two potential problems. The first concerns sample
selection biases. I drop -observations from the analysis for
three reasons: i) the resondent fails to reportan expected date
of retirement, ii) the reported date isobviously nonsensical
(e.g. it precedes the date at which it was reported), or iii) the
household disappeared from the RHS prior to retirement. Note
that the first two items both reflect household characteristics
that are known when the respondent makes his forecast. Sincethe
forecasts are then presumably conditioned on thisinformation, no
sample selection biases arise. The third item (subsequent
attrition) is potentially problematic.I return to this issue in
Section 4,where Ipropose andimplement a statistical
correction.
The second problemconcernsthenon—independence of
realizations. In a short panel such as the RHS, forecast errors
are probably correlated across observations, due to "macro"
events. Since the 1970's witnessed several large andpotentially
unexpected real increases in social security benefits, this
problem is potentially severe. In particular, real social
security benefits increased by 42c in anuary, 1970, 4.8c in
3!anuary, 1971, and 14.1 in September, 1972.In addition,
benefits were "double indexed" for inflation from 1975 to1977.12
If, as suggested by many analysts, unanticipated increases in
social security benefitscausedmanyworkersto retire
unexpectedly early, then we might well find that expectations
were systematically off during this period.On the other hand,
the major benefit increases were primarily concentrated in a few
years (especially 1972). It should be possible toshedsome
light on the question of whether these changes were indeed
unanticipated by looking for evidence of systematic forecast
errors at those points in time.
4.The Mean Value Hypothesis
Ibeginformalanalysisof the data by comparing
expectations to mean realizations, in order to test the first
hypothesis discussed in section 2. Table 1 contains some highly
revealing summary statistics for married men.For each survey
year, I have grouped observations by common values of ERET. For
each group, I report four things: the difference between the
average dateof actual retirement and ERET, the standard
deviation of the retirement date, the mean squared forecast
error, and the number of observations.
The most striking feature of Table 1 is that there is very
little relationship between ERET and theaverage date of
retirement. To be sure, those with higher values of ERET tend to
retire later, on average. However, the mean date of retirement
coincides with ERET in few if any cells. Indeed, in 2.9 out of 20
cells one can reject the hypothesis that the mean date equalsTable 1: Expectations and MeanRealizations for MarriedMen
ER
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1975 —1.1 —0.5 0.3 0.7
2.1 1.8 1.4 0.9
5.7 3.3 1.9 1.3
263 255 253 135
1976 —2.0 —1.7 —0.3 0.3
2.3 1.8 1.3 0.9
9.4 5.9 1.7 0.9
112 93 78 7613
ERET with at least 95'c confidence.2 Roughly speaking, it appears
that a 1 year change in the expected date is associated with
slightly less than a one—half year change in the average realized
date. Theimplicationsofequation (1)are strongly
contradicted.
Other aspects of Table 1 are also puzzling. The standard
deviation of RET does not appear to be higher for groups that
intend to retire in the more distant future, despite the fact
that information should improveas retirementgrows more
imminent.Similarly, mean squared forecast errors do not rise
monotonically with ERET.Yet standard errors and mean squared
forecast errors both fall monotonically between successive survey
years. The mean value hypothesis provides no clue as to the
source of this trend.
As remarked in Section 3, these calculations suffer from
potential sample selection biases. Specifically, I have dropped
from my sample all individuals who leave the survey before
retiring.Unless attrition is associated with earlier—than—
normal retirement, the (objective) expected date of retirement
for such individuals, conditionalupon ERETand observed
behavior, exceedsthe expectationbased upon ERET alone.
Accordingly, the omission of these observations probably biases
the estimated mean retirement date downwards.
To correct for this problem, one must know something about
the retirement behavior of individuals after they leave the
sample.By definition, this is unobservable. Consequently, it14
is necessary to maintain an ancillaryhypothesis. In order to
make some illustrative calculations, I assume thatattrition is
not systematically related to subsequent retirement.3This
assumption allows me to correct for sample selection as follows.
For each subsample (characterized bysurvey year and ERET), I
calculate hazard rates for retirement in eachyear, i.e. the
number of individuals retiring in thatyear divided by the total
number of individuals remaining from theoriginal subsample
(including thosewho subsequentlyleft the sample before
retiring). Under my maintained hypothesis, this yieldsa
consistent estimate of the true population hazard rate.From
these rates, one can then reconstruct the truedistribution of
retirement dates.
In practice, relatively few individuals who metmy other
selection criteria actually left the sample beforeretiring.As
a result, the impact of this correction was ectremely small. For
most cells, the mean of the corrected distributionexceeded the
uncorrected mean by 0.1 year; in a few cases the differencewas
0.2 years, and in a few others it wasvirtually zero. The
correcteddistributionsstrongly resembled the uncorrected
distributions, and indeed the modes did not differ inany cell.
Thus, I conclude that the sample selection bias is of little
consequence. Furthermore, I suspect that the correction used
here overstatesthe bias,in that attrition is probably
correlated with earlier—than—normal retirement.
In light of the results in Table 1, it shouldhardly be15
surprising that a regression of RET on ERET produces extremely
negative results. Coefficient estimates appear in equation 1 of
Table 2.These results are based on expectations reported in
1971, but are representative of other years as well. I have
chosen to report results for 1971 only because the data for that
year are somewhat superior (in 1969, the ESS variable, used
below, is flawed; in 1973, ERET is not available for married
women; in 1975, the total data sample is much smaller).Note
that the intercept is non—zero, and dwarfs its standard error.
The coefficient of ERET is far below unity, and is estimated very
precisely. Formally, this signals a resounding rejection of the
null hypothesis.
Vet one should not be too hasty in discarding the mean value
hypothesis. I obtained similar negative findings in my analysis
of expectations concerning social security benefits, but noted
that these could be attributable to "noisy" measurement of the
expectations variable. Formal analysis bore this conjecture out.
It is therefore advisable to investigate the same possibility in
the current context.
The classical remedy for measurement error is instrumental
variables. In the current context, a variable is a valid
instrument if it belongs to the information set on which the
individual based his expectation. Unfortunately, the identity of
this set is known only to the individual. Accordingly, one must.
maintain the hypothesis that individuals do use certain kinds of
information in order to conduct the test.Table 2: Regression Results for 1971
EquationNumber
1 2 3 4
Technique OLS IV IV IV

















B2 0.080 0.002 0.036 0.05516
The evidence in my previous study supported the viewthat
individuals use the same information to form all of their
expectations. This suggests that other expectations (ESS, EOI)
are valid instruments.Of course, these variables may also be
measured with error, but this is of noconsequence as long as the
measurement errors are uncorrelated. Equation 2 in Table 2
providesestimatedcoefficients,wherethe expectational
variables have been used as instruments. While the estimatesare
somewhat less precise than those obtainedthrough OLS, the
overall picture is unchanged.
Forcompleteness, Ihaveincludedtwoadditional
regressions, using the other two sets of informational variables
as instruments. One can think of these regressions asreflecting
alternative hypotheses about the kinds of informationthat
workers actuallyusewhen constructir.g their forecasts. The
results are uniformly negative. I obtain the most favorable
estimates by using CSS as an instrument (equation (3)).However,
my previous study clearly established that individuals do not
make use of all the information contained in CSS ——itis
therefore an unsuitable instrument.
These results contrast with my findings forexpectations
about social security benefits.The statistical failure of the
mean value hypothesis cannot in this case be traced to the
presence of measurement error.Upon reflection, this is hardly
surprising. Since individuals probably do not have very precise
notions about their future social securitybenefits, it stands to17
reason that they will report "ballpark" figures. However, it
seems likely that most workers form very specific plans about the
timing of retirement, particularly as it becomes more imminent.
It is difficult to understand why an individual wouldreport that
he intends to retire at age 63, if in fact he plans to doso at
age 6.
It is, of course, possible that the negative results in
Table 2all stem from a failure to identify appropriate
instruments.I therefore present one final set of estimates in
Table 3.Here, I have regressed the forecast error (RET—ERET) on
the full complement of informational variables.This procedure
yields consistent estimates even if ERET is measured with error
(unfortunately, it precludes us from testing the theory by
examining the coefficient of ERET). If the mean value hypothesis
is correct, then one can determine the kinds of information that
individuals either ignore or use iniproperly by examining the
coefficient estimates. Note first that the coefficients of the
expectational variables are not significantly different from
zero. This finding validates the use of these variables as
instruments, and strengthens the conclusion that my negative
results are not attributable to measurement error.Variables
appearing with statistically significant coefficients include
AGE, GH, and COMPRET. The last of these is particularly
interesting, sinceit suggests that workers at jobs with
mandatory retirement ages tend to believe that they will be able
to continue working longer than they actually can.However, ITable 3: ForecastErrorRegression, 1971
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
Intercept —11.3 ED/b3 —0.59
(2.7) (7.02)
ESS/105 6.02 SPED/b3 —5.37
(8.70) (8.47)
DSS —0.197 WhO7 9.06
(0.215) (7.39)
E0I/105 1.60 GH —0.219
(6.59) (0.112)
DOl —0.121 PH 0.082
(0.149) (0.174)
CSS/105 —1.60 KIDS/b2 0.06
(6.59) (2.65)
AGE 0.195 COMPRET —0.847
(0.044) (0.125)








caution that this conclusion is basedupon a suspect empirical
specification, in that my findings are generally unfavorable to
the mean value hypothesis.
5. The Modal Value Hyothesjs
I now turn to the possibility thatrespondents report their
most likely dates of retirement, rather thanmean dates. To
investigate this hypothesis,I group observations by common
values of ERET for each surveyyear, and compute the modal
realization for each group. Table 4 presents results formarried
men. This table contains 20 cells, identified by thesurvey year
and value of ERET. In each cell, I report (in order) the modal
value of RET minus ERET, the fraction of thegroup for which RET
and ERET coincide, the fraction of thegroup for which RET is
within one year of ERET, and the total number ofobservations.
The most striking aspect of Table 4is that the modal
realization coincides with ERET in 16 out of 20 cells.In the
four remaining cases, the mode differs from ERETby only a single
year, and ERET is the second most common outcome, lagging the
mode by a relatively small margin. Since ERET exceedsthe mode
in exactly half (two) of thesecases, there is no indication of
systematic bias.
One can also obtain some feeling for theaccuracy of
reported expectations by examining the second and third entries
in each cell.I caution against placing too much emphasison the
fraction of respondents for whom RET and ERET coincideexactly.Table 4: Expectations and Modal Realizations for Married Men
Survey Year
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1975 1 0 —1 0
0.18 0.24 0.29 0.47
0.53 0.64 0.80 0.85
263 255 253 135
1976 0 0 0 0
0.22 0.23 0.39 0.62
0.38 0.42 0.66 0.84
112 93 78 7619
An individual who is 82 years old in 1989 and whoreports that he
intends to retire when 65 could plan to leave his job in either
1971, 1972, or 1973, depending upon his exact date of birth.
Since it is impossible to identify the monthduring which an
individualretires, Icannot adjust for this ambiguity.
Accordingly, it is more appropriate to examine the fraction of
individuals for which RET differs from ERET by at mostone year.
Note that as long as individuals do not intend to retire too far
in the future, expectations are highly accurate ——inall 16
cells for which ERET exceeds thesurvey year by four years or
less, more than 5O of the respondents retired within oneyear of
ERET.
As an individual approaches retirement, hepresumably forms
his expectation on the basis of more complete information.We
would therefore expect the accuracy of his forecast toimprove.
It is possible to examine this prediction in two differentways.
First, one can investigate the relationship between ERET and
accuracy during any survey year by reading down collumns. While
accuracy does not decline monotonical].y with the expected date of
retirement, there is a generally tendency for it to fall.
Second, one can examine the relationship betweenaccuracy and the
survey date for any given value of ERET by reading across rows.
Note that in 23 of 24 possible pairwisecomparisons (12 for
fractions with RET =ERET,12 for fractions with RET within one
year of ERET), accuracy improves when the question is posed at a
later date.In the one remaining case, it is simply unchanged.20
This finding provides striking confirmation for the view that
information improves as individuals approach retirement.
An additional feature of Table 4 merits comment. Let T
denote the survey year. Fix t, and consider individuals who
expect to retire in year T + t. There is a strong tendency for
the accuracy of expectations to rise with T (to see this, read
Table 4 diagonally).The reason for this phenomenon is not
immediately obvious.At first, one might suppose that, given t.
(expected length of time until the event of interest), the date
of reporting should not affect accuracy. However, one must bear
in mind that average age is greater in later survey years. This
causes significant compression of the retirement distribution,
which leads in turn to greater accuracy.This observation
underscores an important point: one should not assume that the
shape of the conditional distribution is invariant with respect
to either ERET or age.I will return to this point shortly.
Table 4 also sheds some light on the question of whether
unanticipated changes in social security benefits during the
early 1970's caused many workers to retire earlier than expected.
Recall that by far the largest real benefit increase took place
in 1972. If this change induced substantial early retirement, we
would expect to see abnormal deviations from retirement plans
during this period. There is little evidence of this in Table 4.
A substantial number of respondents in both 1969 and 1971
reported that they expected to retire after 1972. In 6 of the 8
relevant cells, the modal expectation still coincides with ERET.21
For those reporting ERET =1975in 1969, the modal realization
was actually after 1975, not before.Only for those reporting
ERET =1973in 1989 was the modal realization less than ERET, and
indeed in this case 1972 was the mostfrequent date of
retirement.Note, however, that 1989 forecasts for those with
ERET =1973are only slightly less accurate than 1971 forecasts
for those with ERET =1975(also 4 years in the future). Note
also that 1971 forecasts for those with ERET =1973are actually
more accurate than either 1973 forecasts for those with ERET =
1975,or 1969 forecasts for those with ERET =1971(both also 2
years in the future). Together, these observations suggest that
changes in benefit levels did not induce substantial early
retirement for individuals who had expected to stop working in
1973.
The substantial divergence of means and modes (Tables 1 and
4) suggests that the conditional distributions of retirement
dates may be highly skewed. This supposition is in fact correct.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the distribution of retirement dates
by ERET for 1969.One can see that when ERET is low, the
conditional distribution is skewed to the right; as ERET rises,
the skew shifts to the left. If reported expectations represent
modes rather than means, this pattern is natural. Those
expecting to retire very soon will, if surprised, generally
retire later, and those expecting to retire late will, if
surprised, generally retire sooner. This explains why the mean











































































































































































































































































































Failure to recognize this pattern can easily lead to
misinterpretation of the data. Consider for example the study by
Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn [19B6J. These authors examined
the relationship between unexpected deviations from retirement
plans, and unexpected changes in social security benefits. They
calculated the latter variable by comparing actual benefits
available in the year of expected retirement to the level of
benefits that would have been available had the 1969 statutes
been adjusted for cost of living only. Through multinomial logit
analysis, they found that respondents who experienced larger
unexpected increases in social security benefits were much more
prone to retire earlier than planned.Vet it now seems likely
that this finding is merely an artifact of the data. Note that
the authors' measure of unexpected benefit increases is primarily
determined by ERET ——thelater the respondent expects to retire,
the more 1969 legislation will understate benefits available in
the year of expected retirement. Furthermore, the pattern of
skewness implies that higher values of ERET are associated with a
greater frequency of unexpected early retirement. Combining
these two observations leads one to expect a strong positive
association between unexpected benefits and early retirement,
even in the absence of a behavioral response.It is therefore
conceivable that the finding is entirely spurious.
In fact, Figures 1 and 2 provide only a very slight
indication that the 1972 benefit changes may have induced some
early retirement.In particular, the distributions for ERET =23
1969, 1973, and 1975 exhibit somewhat higher frequencies for 1972
than one might ordinarily expect. However, the pattern is
certainly far from overwhelming.
As a final step, I provide a comparison of expectations and
realizations for various population subgroups, including married
men, married women, single men, single women, widowers, widows,
married men with high wealth, married men with low wealth,
married men with high levels of educational attainment,, and
married men with low levels of educational attainment. I present
results in Tables 5 through 8, which correspond to each of four
different survey years (1969 through 1975).Several consistent
patterns emerge.First, married women form the least accurate
expectations, and are most likely to work longer than planned.
Lower accuracy results in part from the fact thatwomen tend to
be younger, and therefore further fromretirement, than their
husbands. However, even if one compensates for this by, for
example, comparing married men in 1969 to married women in 1975,
the patt1ei-n is still evident. Second, there is a general
tendency for single individuals, widows, and widowers to retire
earlier than expected more frequently than married individuals.
Third, in early survey waves the expectations of single women and
widows were much less accurate than those of marriedmen.
However, in later waves this gap narrowed, and indeed the
expectations of single women actually became more accurate than
those of married men. Fourth, educationappears to be inversely























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































early survey waves, but negatively related in later waves.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section is strongly
consistent with the joint hypotheses that U when asked to report
an expected date of retirement, an individual will describe the
outcome that he or she considers most likely, and ii) the
subjective distribution of retirement dates coincides with the
objective distribution. Since this distribution is highly
skewed, and since the skewness is related to the expected date of
retirement, one cannot interpret the data as reflecting mean
retirement dates.Finally, there is little or no evidence to
support the view that unanticipated benefit increases led many
workers to retire unexpectedly during the early 1970's.25
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Footnotes
1. It is worth noting that the data do notappear to be
consistent with the hypothesis that individuals report the
medians of objective distributions. In fact, the pattern of
medians is quite similar to the pattern of means.
2. It is possible to obtain the standard deviation of themean
retirement date in each cell from thestandarddeviation of the
retirement date and the number of observations.
3. This assumption may seem peculiar when attrition is due to
death.If, however, one believes (as seems natural) that
individuals report expected dates of retirement conditionalupon
surviving until retirement, then the assumption is appropriate,
since one wishes to know what each individual would have done had
he survived.